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21 Introduction
In 1999, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision released a proposal
for a new capital adequacy agreement (Basel II), which shall displace the ex-
isting agreement presumably by 2006. While improving risk weighting, the
Basel Committee is anxious to keep the capital requirement associated with
an average risky portfolio more or less unchanged. This concern has been
caused partly by observations that capital-to-asset ratios increased consider-
ably in the aftermath of the launch of the ﬁrst Basel accord (Jackson, 1999).
The European Central Bank (2003) presents such evidence for a number
of European banks; similar results are also reported for Switzerland (Rime,
2001), Spain (Ayuso, Pérez and Saurina, 2004) and for the U.S. (Flannery
and Rangan, 2004, and Peura and Jakivuolle, 2004).
At ﬁrst sight, one possible reason for building-up such capital cushions
might be the exceptional rise in the stock markets during the period under
consideration.1 At this time, banks were clearly in a comfortable position
to raise new funds by issuing shares and the rise in the stock market also
indicates that banks were able to reinvest earnings considerably. As capital
cushions would then merely exist accidentally, it has also been argued that
those cushions may emerge as a systemic result of the dynamic management
of a bank’s portfolio. In general, proﬁt maximizing banks trade oﬀ costs of
approaching or falling below the minimum requirement with those associated
with raising capital up-front or with recapitalization when the requirement is
violated. For example, Furﬁne (2000) argues that these costs might come in
1The capital cushion is deﬁned as the percentage actual capital in excess of the mini-
mum requirement.
3form of intensiﬁed supervisory review, a weakened reputation or immediacy
of the need to restore the capital position either by cutting lending or trying
to obtain new external capital.2
Such portfolio management considerations are broadly consistent with
the available empirical evidence and have thereby substantially improved
our understanding of the banks’ reaction to capital regulation. But how do
ﬁnancial markets respond to possible changes in a bank’s behavior? This
question may be important if those responses also inﬂuence the ability of
banks to perform their functions. When capital regulation aﬀects a bank’s
portfolio decision in a way that does not coincide with the needs of the bank’s
customers, the latter may react such that the bank is forced to hold capital
cushions in order to provide its customers with services required by them.
Considering liquidity provision as the major function a bank, this paper aims
to provide a rationale for holding a capital cushion in line with the existing
functional approach to banking.
The starting point of our analysis is Diamond and Rajan (2001). In their
setting depository institutions (banks) exist as liquidity creators in a world
of incomplete ﬁnancial contracts. They consider a banker as a relationship
lender endowed with speciﬁc skills. These skills allow her to enhance the
ability of a borrower to commit himself to fulﬁll loan obligations even if his
ultimate lenders are in need of funds at short notice. The banker can do so
because she knows at best how to extract payments from the project’s as-
sets without employing the borrower’s speciﬁc skills. Therefore, a borrower’s
threat to withdraw his speciﬁc knowledge from the project once the invest-
2For related portfolio approaches see also Estrella (2004) and Peura and Keppo (2003),
Jokivuolle and Kauko (2001).
4ment is placed looses bite and he can credibly commit to pay out a larger
share of his return to his lender if he is bound to a banker.
On the other hand, by construction of the demand deposit contract, a
banker can credibly commit herself not to hold up her ﬁnanciers since any
attempt to hold up depositors results in a bank run. Owing to this special
characteristic of a deposit contract, deposits strictly dominate bank capital
as long as project returns are certain (Diamond and Rajan, 2000). While this
approach explains liquidity provision by banks, there is no reason why a bank
should exceed regulatory capital requirements once they are introduced. The
reason is that a banker facing a binding regulatory capital-to-asset ratio can
extract more rents, which in turn always reduces the amount she can pledge
to her ﬁnanciers. To close this gap we show in this paper that the amount
a banker can pledge to ultimate ﬁnanciers may also depend on her capital
structure in a non-monotonic way.
This result arises when renegotiations are risky and the banker is risk
averse with decreasing absolute risk aversion. In our setting, capital does
not serve as a buﬀer against shocks to project returns but as a strategic
tool for renegotiations with borrowers. When the capital-to-asset ratio ex-
ceeds some critical value, the banker can share her risk of a renegotiation
breakdown with her shareholders to an increasing degree, making her less
reluctant to assume the risk of a renegotiation breakdown. As this improves
her bargaining position, she is able to extract even higher payments from
her borrower. On the other hand, as in Diamond and Rajan (2000), an in-
creasing capital-to-asset ratio also improves her ability to extract rents at the
expense of equity claimants. Hence, whether payments, which can credibly
5be pledged to ultimate ﬁnanciers, are increasing or not depends on a tradeoﬀ
between enhancing the bankers ability to extract payments from borrowers
and capturing rents.
The argument that the capital structure can be used as a strategic tool
in negotiations with a third party is not novel. For example, Perotti and
Spier (1993) suggest that an entrepreneur makes use of senior debt claims as
a bargaining tool to extort his contracting party. However, Perotti and Spier
focus on the strategic relationship between shareholders and labor unions and
show how an entrepreneur can use debt-for-equity exchanges to extract wage
concessions from his employees; they do not apply this idea to a banker whose
economically valuable function is liquidity creation. Moreover, they argue by
means of the Nash-bargaining solution to renegotiations assuming that utility
over the set of possible bargaining outcomes is convex, which leaves open why
the players’ attitudes towards risk may matter for renegotiations. In this
paper, instead, we utilize a non-cooperative game structure with stochastic
bargaining costs to provide a microeconomic rationale for that risk aversion
may matter.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 analyzes the determinants of
a bank’s capital structure and asks how the amount of funds the bank can
raise from her ﬁnanciers depends on her capital structure. Section 3 focuses
on the consequences of binding minimum capital adequacy ratios for bank
lending. Section 4 discusses some policy implications. Section 5 summarizes
the results.
62 Determinants of a bank’s capital structure
2.1 Financial contracts with the risk of renegotiation
break down
In a ﬁrst step, we show in a non-cooperative game setting how, in general,
the bargaining solution of renegotiations depends on the parties’ attitudes
towards risk. Following Hart and Moore (1994) we consider a ﬁnancial rela-
tionship between an entrepreneur and a lender (not necessarily a bank yet).
The entrepreneur runs a ﬁrm and possesses a project idea but is endowed
with no own funds. His external ﬁnancial needs are, thus, identical with the
size I of the investment project.3
The project lasts for one period or two dates T = 0,1 respectively. The
project requires an initial investment of I at T = 0 and yields a non-veriﬁable
cash ﬂow of Y > I at T = 1 if the entrepreneur contributes his speciﬁc skills.
The physical assets created in the course of the initial investment may also
have a value without the entrepreneur’s speciﬁc skills. This second best
alternative use is referred to as liquidation and has a veriﬁable return of
L ∈ (0,I) at T = 1.
As in Hart and Moore (1994) and Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001) we
assume that the entrepreneur cannot commit to contributing his speciﬁc skills
to the project in the remote future but only for a short period of time. Hence,
once the investment is placed, the entrepreneur might initiate renegotiations
shortly before the project matures in order to beat down loan repayments
by threatening to withdraw his speciﬁc skills. Only if both parties reach an
3Henceforth, all payments are measured in real terms and the discount factor is nor-
malized to 1.
7agreement the entrepreneur will actually contribute his speciﬁc skills and the
project turns out to be successful.
The renegotiation game in extensive form is assumed to have the following
general structure (Rubinstein, 1982): If the entrepreneur refuses to fulﬁl his
originally given debt obligation H ≥ I, both parties meet to start a ﬁrst
bargaining round. In this ﬁrst round, the entrepreneur oﬀers an alternative
repayment P which can be either accepted or rejected by the lender. If the
latter rejects P she makes a counteroﬀer R in the second round. When the
entrepreneur rejects this counteroﬀer R, an independent arbitrator ﬁxes a
repayment X ∈ (L,Y ), which is known to both parties at the beginning of
renegotiations.
In extension to this general structure of the Rubinstein game it is rea-
sonable to suppose that the bargaining outcome is not certain. Firstly, the
parties’ threat points may be uncertain. For example, the lender does not
know the liquidation value of assets precisely when entering into renegoti-
ations. Secondly, an arbitrator’s decision cannot be anticipated deﬁnitely
because there are some unforeseeable events driving his decision and parties
cannot exert inﬂuence on these events. Finally, renegotiations may also be
associated with bargaining costs. In each bargaining round parties may be
forced to bear these costs in order to continue and advance the bargaining
process. These costs, containing expenses for legal assistance and expertises,
are typically not known for sure by the parties at the beginning of renego-
tiations. Then there is a risk that these costs become as large as it is not
worthwhile for one party or the other to carry renegotiations forward.
8There are many reasons why renegotiations are risky and may even break-
down because of some exogenous events. The following speciﬁcation of the
bargaining process operationalizes the general idea of risky bargaining in a
stylized but tractable way. Several other ways are conceivable without chang-
ing the main implications. We suppose that, if the lender rejects the ﬁrst
oﬀer P made by the entrepreneur, she applies for an insolvency proceeding at
a court of justice. Since project returns Y are non-veriﬁable by courts at this
early stage of the hearing, the court may decide to dissmiss this application
with probability (1 − p) because it expects that bankruptcy assets lack to
cover the costs of the legal procedure. In this case, the lender seizes the real
assets. On the other hand, with probability p ∈ (0,1), the court opens the
insolvency proceeding and allows the lender to make a counteroﬀer R (see
ﬁgure 1).
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In this second round the entrepreneur decides whether or not to accept
R. While deciding on accepting R the entrepreneur has to take into account
that, with probability q ∈ (0,1), the court has learned that the project’s
conjectural value is   Y ∈ (L,Y ). Maybe, this conjectural value   Y is Y net
of legal charges: Suppose the judge comes to know the true value Y of the
project with probability q; having subtracted the court costs a total of   Y
remains to be shared between the lender and the entrepreneur. Hence, with
probability q the judge will convict the entrepreneur to pay out an amount X
to the lender, which is at most the original repayment obligation H (maybe
plus a ﬁne) or   Y , i.e. X = min
￿
H,   Y
￿
. On the other hand, with probability
9(1 − q), the court has no additional valuable information on the project‘s
value and, hence, allows the lender to liquidate the entrepreneur‘s assets.
By backward induction, the entrepreneur accepts the lender’s counteroﬀer
R in round 2 if
U(Y − R) ≥ qU(Y − X) + (1 − q)U(0), (1)
where U denotes the entrepreneur’s von Neumann/Morgenstern utility index.
Thus, the lender will oﬀer R such that the entrepreneur is just indiﬀerent to
accept, i.e. R equals the certainty equivalent of a lottery
Γ2 =
￿
Y − X with probability q
0 with probability 1 − q (2)
By inspecting (1) we obtain R ∈
￿
min
￿
H,   Y
￿
,Y
￿
> L.
In the ﬁrst bargaining round the lender accepts the entrepreneur’s original
oﬀer P if
V (P) ≥ pV (R) + (1 − p)V (L) (3)
where V denotes the lender’s von Neumann/Morgenstern utility index. Ac-
cordingly, the entrepreneur sets P equal to the lender’s certainty equivalent
of a lottery
Γ1 =
￿
R with probability p
L with probability 1 − p . (4)
It follows P ∈ (L,Y ) irrespectively whether H >   Y or not.
Consequently, whenever P < H the entrepreneur will certainly refuse to
meet his repayment obligation at T = 1 and the lender is, thus, not willing
to conclude a ﬁnancial contract at T = 0 because loan repayments do not
cover the opportunity costs of the provided funds.
10The subgame perfect equilibrium solution P depends on the liquidation
value L, the project’s cash ﬂow Y and its veriﬁable part   Y , and the proba-
bilities p and q, as well as on the respective attitudes towards risks of both
parties: On the one hand, a more risk averse entrepreneur both accepts a
higher payment R in the second round and oﬀers a higher payment P in the
ﬁrst round than a less risk averse entrepreneur. On the other hand, the re-
payment the lender is just willing to accept in the ﬁrst round will be smaller
the more risk averse she behaves.
So far, we have considered the renegotiation process between the entrepre-
neur and a lender, given that there is a risk of breakdown in renegotiations.
Next we turn to the speciﬁc role of demandable deposits, which are oﬀered
by a bank.
2.2 Bank ﬁnance by demandable deposits
Assume that liquidation of the physical assets requires speciﬁc liquidation
skills. Acquiring these skills is a time and eﬀort consuming business so that
the lender bears some (non-monetary) disutility. To economize on these
costs it is optimal to mandate a single banker to acquire these liquidation
skills, who acts on behalf of all ﬁnanciers in ﬁnancial contracting with the
entrepreneur. Without loss of generality, these costs are normalized to zero.
The banker is assumed to possess no own ﬁnancial wealth. Instead, to
grant a loan to the entrepreneur, she has to raise money from ﬁnanciers.
This generates an overlapping hold-up problem since not only the entrepre-
neur may refuse to meet his loan obligations but the banker may also want
to renegotiate her obligations owed to ﬁnanciers. She can do so because,
11while accompanying the project from its very ﬁrst stage, she is the only one
who develops speciﬁc skills in identifying how to bring out the best liquida-
tion value of the project, whereas anyone else yields much lower liquidation
proceeds. Hence, the banker may threaten not to utilize her skills unless
obligations are renegotiated.
If, however, the banker takes money from ﬁnanciers by means of a de-
posit contract, the hold-up problem between the banker and the ﬁnanciers
vanishes. Diamond and Rajan (2001) show that the deposit contract cre-
ates a collective action problem among depositors making any attempt of
the banker to renegotiate deposits to result in a bank run and total disin-
termediation. This disintermediation disables the banker to cover her initial
costs of acquiring liquidation skills. Thus, she is not inclined to renegotiate
demandable deposits unless it is absolutely necessary. By issuing demand-
able deposits, the banker is able to attract suﬃcient funds if repayments
pledgeable by the entrepreneur covers at least investment expenses.
2.3 Mixed bank ﬁnance
So far, we have assumed that the bank completely ﬁnances her assets by
demand deposits. Now, we consider the case when the banker uses a mixed
capital structure and chooses a capital-to-asset ratio k, i.e. the share of
equity E in total funds raised from ﬁnanciers. To simplify matters, suppose
that the banker and equity shareholders equally share the loan repayments
from the entrepreneur net of deposits owed to depositors.4 Then, the capital
4Note that renegotiations with shareholders do not impose a stochastic bargaining
process as renegotiations with borrowers do. The reason is that a banker holds a ﬁxed
claim on the cashﬂow of the borrower whereas the shareholders’ claim on a bank is not
ﬁxed. Non-payment of promised dividends does typically not trigger a default or any legal
12ratio is given by
k =
1
2 (P − D)
1
2 (P − D) + D
=
P − D
P + D
(5)
implying
D =
1 − k
1 + k
P. (6)
Hence, for a given capital-to-asset ratio renegotiation proof payment P sat-
isﬁes:
V
￿
max
￿
1
2
￿
P −
1 − k
1 + k
P
￿
,0
￿￿
= (7)
pV
￿
max
￿
1
2
￿
R −
1 − k
1 + k
P
￿
,0
￿￿
+ (1 − p)V
￿
max
￿
1
2
￿
L −
1 − k
1 + k
P
￿
,0
￿￿
and we obtain
Lemma 1 If the banker exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion, then the
maximum pledgeable loan repayment P is decreasing in k for low k but in-
creasing in k for high k.
Proof. See Appendix.
The interpretation of lemma 1, part 1, is as follows: If renegotiations
with the borrower fail, the banker can share the risk of this renegotiations
breakdown with shareholders. If, on the other hand, renegotiations succeed,
the loan repayments collected by the banker (net of deposit repayments) are
divided equally between shareholders and the banker. Hence, the banker’s
risk burdens are less meaningful for a higher capital ratio if she exhibits
decreasing attitudes towards risk. This, in turn, strengthens her bargaining
position vis-à-vis borrowers.
action per se. Instead, the board of directors and the shareholders bargain over dividends
in the course of a shareholders’ meeting.
13Part 2 of lemma 1 deals with the situation that the capital-to-asset ra-
tio k is low such that the banker gets nothing if renegotiations break down
(because everything she collects from liquidation is forwarded to depositors).
Then, the maximum pledgeable loan repayments are a decreasing function of
k if the banker behaves risk avers. The reason for this is that a variation in
k does not aﬀect the banker‘s net income position in case of a renegotiations
breakdown but only if renegotiations succeed. But a risk averse banker is less
willing to accept a higher risk of a renegotiation breakdown, i.e. the certainty
equivalent of the lottery does not increase proportionally and therefore P de-
creases. To put it the other way round, maximum pledgable loan repayments
increase if the capital ratio decreases and reach a local maximum at k = 0,
i.e. if the banker completely reﬁnances herself by deposit contracts.
We further conclude:
Lemma 2 Pledgeable loan repayments P are maximized if the bank chooses
a capital structure given by k∗ = 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Since the loan repayment P = π(k,L) is divided up between deposi-
tors, shareholders and the banker, these three parties receive the following
amounts:
• The depositors:
D =
1 − k
1 + k
π(k,L); (8)
• the suppliers of equity ﬁnance:
E =
1
2
(P − D) =
k
1 + k
π(k,L); (9)
14• the banker:
Q =
1
2
(P − D) =
k
1 + k
π(k,L), (10)
Hence, the maximum amount of funds the banker can attract for a given
capital ratio is Z = E + D =
π(k,L)
1+k . Since
dZ
dk
=
dπ(k,L)
dk (1 + k) − π(k,L)
(1 + k)2 ￿ 0, (11)
the amount of funds a banker can raise depends on the capital ratio in a non-
trivial matter: At ﬁrst, if k < ˆ k, for which we have dπ(k,L)/dk < 0, it follows
unambiguously dZ/dk < 0. However, if k > ˆ k we have dπ(k,L)/dk > 0 and
the sign of dZ/dk is a priori not clear. Two eﬀects work in opposite directions:
A risk sharing eﬀect and a holdup eﬀect. By the former an increase in k
increases P, i.e. the risk sharing eﬀect improves the ability of the banker to
raise funds. But an increase in k also leads to a rise in the rent the banker
can extract from renegotiations with shareholders (holdup eﬀect) because of:
Lemma 3 The rent of the banker is monotonically increasing in k.
Proof. See Appendix.
3 Bank competition and the eﬀects of mini-
mum capital adequacy ratios
So far we have not allowed for regulatory capital requirements. To analyze
the eﬀects of those regulations we have to distinguish between diﬀerent com-
petitive structures in the banking industry. At ﬁrst, suppose that the banker
possesses some monopoly power vis-a-vis her borrowers. For this case, we
conclude:
15Proposition 1 Suppose the banker possesses monopoly power vis-a-vis her
borrowers. Since the rent the banker can extract increases monotonically in
k she chooses a capital-to-asset ratio k∗ = max{k : π(k,L)/(1 + k) ≥ I} if
there is no minimum capital adequacy ratio. In the presence of a capital
adequacy requirement kreg
1. the bankers choice of k∗ is unaﬀected by those requirements if k∗ ≥ kreg,
2. there is disintermediation if k∗ < kreg.
Proof. The proof follows directly from lemmata 1 to 3.
The intuition behind the ﬁrst result is that a banker, who extracts the
largest rent at the expense of her contracting partners, chooses a capital-
to-asset ratio k∗ that maximizes that rent provided that it still allows her
to raise funds just suﬃcient to ﬁnance the investment project. Further, if
a regulatory capital-to-asset ratio is imposed it does either not matter or
leads to total disintermediation depending on how large the required ratio
is. Disintermediation comes into eﬀect when the required ratio exceeds the
maximum capital-to-asset ratio that just allows the banker to raise suﬃcient
funds for investment ﬁnance.
Positive rents, however, attract new bankers into the marktet and banking
competition will melt down a banker’s rents to zero. Since the capital-to-asset
ratio k is the only instrument variable, in a competitive equilibrium without
regulatory requirements every banker chooses k = 0, i.e. competition force
them to forward the maximum pledgeable loan repayments to their respective
depositors. This competitive equlibrium, however, is not independent from
banking regulation, and imposing a minimum capital adequacy ratio may
16have an impact on the banker’s choice of k in a way that is not intended by
the regulator.
Proposition 2 In a competitive banking industry the banker chooses a
capital-to-asset ratio k∗ = 0 if there is no minimum capital adequacy ratio.
However, in the presence of a capital adequacy requirement kreg
1. the banker will choose
k
∗ = min{k : π(k,L)/(1 + k) ≥ I ∧ k ≥ k
reg} (12)
if {k : π(k,L)/(1 + k) ≥ I ∧ k ≥ kreg}  = ∅,
2. there is disintermediation otherwise.
Proof. Again, the proof follows from lemmata 1 to 3.
Part 1 of the proposition says that the banker chooses the minimum out
of a set of capital-to-asset ratios that both meet the regulatory requirement
and enables her to credibly commit to pay out ﬁnanciers at least the in-
vested amount I. This formulation includes the case where the banker just
meets the regulatory requirement if and only if π(kreg,L)/(1 + kreg) ≥ I.
But it also includes that the banker may choose even a larger k∗ satisfying
π(k∗,L)/(1 + k∗) = I if π(kreg,L)/(1 + kreg) < I, i.e. the actual capital-to-
asset ratio is in excess of the required minimum ratio. She will do so because
satisfying the requirement with equality leads to an insuﬃcient amount she
can credibly commit to repay. However, increasing her capital-to-asset ratio
allows her to collect even more from her borrower and thereby to repay at
least I to the ultimate ﬁnanciers. If either condition cannot be met there
will be disintermediation.
17To illustrate our main results we use the following example:
Example 1 Assume V (x) =
√
x, p = 0.7, R = 950, L = 705. Then, the
shapes of the resulting P and Z curves are given as presented in ﬁgures 2
and 3 (please note the diﬀerent scaling of the y-axis). Suppose the mandatory
capital requirement is k = 0.08. Then, ﬁgure 3 allows to separate three cases
which diﬀer in the size I of the investment project the banker has to ﬁnance:
• If I = 764 a monopolist banker chooses k∗ ≈ 11.2% given by the inter-
cept of the Z-curve and the lowest horizontal line in ﬁgure 3 irrespec-
tive whether there are regulatory capital requirements or not. Under
competition, however, the banker’s chooses an k equal to the manda-
tory capital requirement instead of k = 0 and, therefore, extracts some
rents.
• If I = 767 a monopolist banker chooses k∗ ≈ 10.3% given by the right-
most intercept of the Z-curve and the middle horizontal line again irre-
spective whether there are regulatory capital requirements or not. Un-
der competition, she chooses the smallest k for which she is just able to
repay I, i.e. k ≈ 8.1% which (slightly) exceeds the regulatory require-
ment.
• If I = 770, the banker is not able to fulﬁl the capital requirement and the
project cannot be ﬁnanced because ﬁnanciers are not willing to supply
an amount of funds which equals the size of the investment. In this
case, minimum adequacy ratios lead to disintermediation irrespective
whether there is competition or not in the banking industry.
18— Figure 2 about here —
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4 Policy implications
Our considerations also allow to lend some additional support for the cycli-
cality hypothesis expressed by academics, practitioners as well as policy
makers.5 According to this hypothesis, Basel II capital standards will ex-
acerbate business cycle ﬂuctuations because borrowers may be downgraded
under Basel II in the course of an economic downturn. In response, this
forces a bank to hold more capital against her current loan portfolio and to
curtail lending, thereby amplifying macroeconomic distortions.
Criticism of that procyclicality hypothesis basically rest on two arguments
calling its main assumptions into question. Firstly, it is at least arguable
whether credit risks really worsen in the course of an economic downturn
(Ayuso, Pérez and Saurina, 2004). Taking changes in credit risk as a change
in the probability density function associated with future credit earnings,
it is not clear why risk changes, and if it changes whether it actually does
so in that predicted direction. It is also conceivable, instead, that banks
simply assume high risks in a boom which then materializes in the following
downturn. In that sense, risk-sensitive capital-to-asset ratios may eﬀectively
work counter-cyclical. Secondly, even when risk-sensitivity forces banks to
hold more capital against their loans, banks may be able to maintain lending
5See, e.g., Danielsson et al. (2001), Erwin and Wilde (2001), Estrella (2004), Gordy
and Howells (2004) and Kashyap and Stein (2004).
19in a recession if they hold suﬃcient capital cushions (Borio et al., 2001, Lowe,
2002).
Since the model presented here is partial and static in its nature one has
to be cautious to translate its results into the dynamics and complexity of
business cycles. Particularly, in contemporary business cycle theory both
banks and ﬁrms are supposed to decide on the basis of rational expecta-
tions regarding changes in fundamentals. On the other hand, future interest
rates, cashﬂows, and liquidation proceeds do not only have an impact on the
described bargaining outcome. Instead, in a general equilibrium both the
bargaining outcome and the fundamentals are endogenous variables evolving
interdependently.
In spite of this, the argument in this paper may imply that the mere
existence of a positive capital cushion does not prevent an economy from pro-
cyclicality in bank lending — even if regulatory capital-to-asset ratios are not
risk-sensitive. This means that pro-cyclicality should already be a problem
with the existing ﬁrst Basel accord. And, more importantly, when this holds
true the same pattern could be expected under the Basel II framework even
for banks to which the standardized approach is applied to, i.e. mainly
small banks. The reason is that, on the one hand, banks need their capital
buﬀers to raise suﬃcient funds from investors and that, on the other hand,
these optimum capital buﬀers are counter-cyclical. This view may help to
explain why a counter-cyclicality in capital cushions can actually already be
detected in existing data, i.e. for the time when the ﬁrst Basel accord has
been eﬀective (Ayuso, Pérez and Saurina, 2004).
20To ﬁgure out the responses of capital holdings to business cycles, we
ask what happens to a banker’s maximum pledgeable payments Z if the
liquidation value L falls, a phenomenon that is typically related to economic
downturns. Since a fall of L weakens a banker’s bargaining position vis-á-vis
her borrower, the entrepreneur’s maximum pledgeable payments fall. This
leads to a decrease in Z, i.e. the amount a banker can credibly commit to
pay to her investors. When the regulatory capital-to-asset ratio is binding,
a banker can (if at all) re-strengthen her bargaining position vis-á-vis her
borrower only by choosing an even higher capital-to-asset ratio because this
makes her less reluctant to engage in risky renegotiations. As a result, there
will be either disintermediation or an increase in the capital cushion.
These considerations yield in:
Proposition 3 In a competitive banking industry and in the presence of a
capital adequacy requirement, a decrease in the liquidation value of assets to
  L < L results in
1. an unchanged capital-to-asset ratio
k
∗∗ = k
∗ = k
reg (13)
if π(kreg,   L)/(1 + kreg) ≥ I,
2. an increase in the capital-to-asset ratio
k
∗∗ = min
￿
k : π(k,   L)/(1 + k) ≥ I ∧ k ≥ k
reg￿
> k
∗ (14)
if
￿
k : π(k,   L)/(1 + k) ≥ I ∧ k ≥ kreg￿
 = ∅,
3. disintermediation otherwise.
21Proof. See Appendix.
This result can be further cleariﬁed by means of our previous example.
Example 2 (cont.) Suppose that collateral damages such that L decreases
to 700. Then, ﬁgure 4 illustrates the eﬀects of capital requirements for a
competitive banking industry.
• If I = 764 the banker’s chooses an k∗ = 8.5 which is higher than in the
benchmark case.
• If I = 767 the banker cannot provide funds because of binding capital
requirements even though she could for L = 705.
• If I = 770 the project cannot get funds either.
— Figure 4 about here —
5 Concluding remarks
Our aim has been to show that the bargaining position of the banker vis-a-vis
her borrowers depends on her capital structure. This eﬀect arises because
the capital structure aﬀects the banker’s ability to commit herself to a harsh
treatment of entrepreneurs. When entrepreneurs default on their debt her
willingness to make concessions depends on how risks associated with bar-
gaining can be shared with ﬁnanciers.
The main results of our analysis are as follows: If the bank possesses
some monopoly power she will choose an equity ratio that maximizes her
rents given that the project can just be ﬁnanced. This choice is unaﬀected
22by regulatory standards as long as these standards are not too strong which
leads to disintermediation. Under competition, however, a banker chooses
k = 0 and forwards maximum pledgable loan repayments to her depositors
as long as there are no minimum adequacy ratios. If, on the other hand,
regulators have chosen mandatory capital adequacy ratio above a certain
level, bankers are either forced to hold an even higher capital ratio or to
drop out of the market.
The results depend on two key assumptions: decreasing risk aversion
and risky bargaining. Although we have applied a highly stylized structure
of the renegotiation game to introduce the notion of risky bargaining, the
implications are even more general. As already mentioned in section 2.1
all we need is to assume that the bargaining outcome cannot precisely be
anticipated by contracting parties. Then, attitudes towards risks matter for
the reneogotiation-proof contract. And it seems to be plausible to assume
that a single agent (banker, entrepreneur) exhibit some degree of risk aversion
and that his attitude towards risks depends on his wealth position with a
wealthy agent being less reluctant to assume the risk of a given lottery than
a poor agent.6
Nothing has been said so far about how reputation changes the results of
our model. Consider a model with an inﬁnite time-horizon where the bor-
rower has investment opportunities in each single period. Then any ﬁnancier
can commit himself to a harsh treatment of borrowers by refusing to grant a
loan in all future dates once the borrower has defaulted. Consequently, any
6Assuming a bank being risk-averse is not uncommon, see, e.g., Koehn and San-
tomero (1980), Kim and Santomero (1988), Rochet (1992), and Froot, Scharfstein and
Stein (1993).
23ﬁnancier can not only extract payments amounting to the net present value
of liquidation proceeds but (nearly) all cashﬂows generated by the borrower.
But then there is no ﬁnancing problem at all and we ﬁnd ourselves in a ﬁrst-
best world where we do not need a bank. Hence, to develop a functional
approach to bank behavior we have to assume that such reputational eﬀects
do not rule out ineﬃciencies completely (see Hart, 1995).
Another possible objection against the incomplete contracts approach to
banking oﬀered by Diamond and Rajan (2001) is that depositors may be fully
protected by deposit insurance (whether implicitly or explicitly). Deposit
insurance is frequently cited as a justiﬁcation for capital regulation. The
argument is that deposit insurance strengthens the incentives for a banker
to engage in too risky lending for which minimum capital requirements are a
suitable response of the regulator. When, however, a regulator is empowered
and committed to close a bank which fails to fulﬁl a capital requirement one
may also argue that the regulator can already close a bank which refuses to
pay out depositors even without imposing any capital requirement. The best
response of a regulator who wants to insure deposts (for some reason) is not
to impose a capital requirement (because this would enable the banker to
extract some rents at the expense of her ﬁnanciers) but to commit himself
to a harsh treatment of failing banks. However, it is beyond the scope of
this paper to provide a fully ﬂedged model of banking regulation taking a
wide range of possible reasons for diﬀerent types of banking regulation into
account. Instead the aim of this paper has been to provide an argument —
based on a functional perspective to banking — why banks hold capital in
excess of regulatory requirements.
24Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
1. At ﬁrst, suppose that k is large so that we have 1
2
￿
L − 1−k
1+kP
￿
≥ 0,
which holds true with strict inequality at least in some neighbourhood
to k = 1. Hence, (7) becomes
V
￿
1
2
￿
P −
1 − k
1 + k
P
￿￿
= pV
￿
1
2
￿
R −
1 − k
1 + k
P
￿￿
+ (1 − p)V
￿
1
2
￿
L −
1 − k
1 + k
P
￿￿
,
where the RHS is the expected utility of the lottery
˜ Γ1 =
￿ ˜ W1 := 1
2
￿
R − 1−k
1+kP
￿
with probability p
˜ W2 := 1
2
￿
L − 1−k
1+kP
￿
with probability 1 − p
,
Without loss of generality this lottery can be transformed to
ˆ Γ1 =
￿ ˆ W1 := W + 1
2(1 − p)(R − L) with probability p
ˆ W2 := W + 1
2p(L − R) with probability 1 − p
,
where W := 1
2
￿
pR + L(1 − p) −
(1−k)
1+k P
￿
denotes the common expected
value of the lotteries ˜ Γ1 and ˆ Γ1. If the utility function V exhibits
decreasing absolute risk aversion, then the certainty equivalent of the
lottery ˆ Γ1, given by the amount C at which
V (C) = pV ( ˆ W1) + (1 − p)V ( ˆ W2)
holds true, is such that the diﬀerence between the expected value W of
the lotterie and the corresponding certainty equivalent C is decreasing
in W (Mas-Colell; Whinston; Green, 1995, p. 193; also see Pratt, 1964).
Since W itself is an increasing function of the capital ratio k this implies
∂C
∂k
>
∂W
∂k
=
P
(1 + k)
2.
25Note that C is given by
C =
1
2
￿
P −
1 − k
1 + k
P
￿
which, for a given P, is increasing in k by P/(1 + k)
2. Hence, maximum
pledgeable loan repayments P are increasing in the capital ratio k.
2. At second, consider k < ˆ k, where ˆ k and the corresponding ˆ P satisfy
1
2
￿
L −
1 − ˆ k
1 + ˆ k
ˆ P
￿
= 0
implying that for all k < ˆ k we have max
￿
1
2
￿
L − 1−k
1+kP
￿
,0
￿
= 0. The
lottery the banker faces now is given by
  Γ1 =
￿   W1 := 1
2
￿
R − 1−k
1+kP
￿
with probability p
  W2 := 0 with probability 1 − p
.
Without loss of generality, set V (0) = 0. The maximum pledgeable
loan repayment P is thus determined by
V
￿
1
2
￿
P −
1 − k
1 + k
P
￿￿
= pV
￿
1
2
￿
R −
1 − k
1 + k
P
￿￿
for which, by the implicit function theorem, we obtain
dP
dk
= −
￿
P
1 + k
￿ V ′ ￿
1
2
￿
P − 1−k
1+kP
￿￿
− pV ′ ￿
1
2
￿
R − 1−k
1+kP
￿￿
V ′ ￿
1
2
￿
P − 1−k
1+kP
￿￿
+ p(1 − k)V ′￿
1
2
￿
R − 1−k
1+kP
￿￿
(15)
where the denominator is strictly positive. Hence, dP/dk < 0 for all
concave utility functions V since for all P ≤ R we have
V
′
￿
1
2
￿
P −
1 − k
1 + k
P
￿￿
≥ V
′
￿
1
2
￿
R −
1 − k
1 + k
P
￿￿
> pV
′
￿
1
2
￿
R −
1 − k
1 + k
P
￿￿
.
26Proof of Lemma 2. Because P is decreasing in k for small k and increasing
in k for large k it is suﬃcient to compare the maximum pledgeable loan
repayments at k = 0 and at k = 1. To simplify notations deﬁne π(k,L)
as the renegotiation proof payment P associated with k and L according to
lemma 1. At k = 0 the maximum pledgeable loan repayments are given by
V (0) = pV
￿
1
2
(R − π(0,L))
￿
+ (1 − p)V (0),
i.e. we have π(0,L) = R. At k = 1 the maximum pledgeable loan repayments
are given by
V
￿
1
2
π(1,L)
￿
= pV
￿
1
2
R
￿
+ (1 − p)V
￿
1
2
L
￿
i.e. we have π(1,L) ∈ (L,R) which is strictly less than R. Hence, π(0,L) >
π(1,L).
Proof of Lemma 3. We have to show that
dQ
dk
=
π(k,L)
(1 + k)2 +
k
1 + k
dπ(k,L)
dk
> 0
holds. Because of (15), this can for k < ˆ k be rewritten as:
dQ
dk
=
π(k,L)
(1 + k)2 (1 − k )
where
  :=
V ′ ￿
1
2
￿
π(k,L) − 1−k
1+kπ(k,L)
￿￿
− pV ′ ￿
1
2
￿
R − 1−k
1+kπ(k,L)
￿￿
V ′ ￿
1
2
￿
π(k,L) − 1−k
1+kπ(k,L)
￿￿
+ p(1 − k)V ′ ￿
1
2
￿
R − 1−k
1+kπ(k,L)
￿￿.
Since numerator in   is smaller then the denominator and because k < 1, we
have dQ/dk > 0 for k < ˆ k. Moreover, since for k ≥ ˆ k we have dπ(k,L)/dk >
0, it follows that dQ/dk > 0 holds in the whole domain [0,1].
27Proof of Proposition 3. Note that dZ/dL =
dπ(k,L)/dL
1+k . An equiva-
lent condition for the results in the proposition is therefore to show that
dπ(k,L)/dL > 0 for high k and dπ(k,L)/dL = 0 for low k.
1. First, suppose that k is large so that 1
2(L− 1−k
1+kP) ≥ 0 holds (see lemma
1). Then, P is implicitly deﬁned as a function of L according to
V
￿
1
2
￿
P −
1 − k
1 + k
P
￿￿
= pV
￿
1
2
￿
R −
1 − k
1 + k
P
￿￿
+ (1 − p)V
￿
1
2
￿
L −
1 − k
1 + k
P
￿￿
,
for which the implicit function theorem yields
dP
dL
=
(1 − p)1
2V ′ ￿
1
2(L − 1−k
1+kP)
￿
Ψ
> 0.
where
Ψ :=
k
1 + k
V
′
￿
1
2
(P −
1 − k
1 + k
P)
￿
+
p
(1 + k)2V
′
￿
1
2
￿
R −
1 − k
1 + k
P
￿￿
+
1 − p
(1 + k)2V
′
￿
1
2
￿
L −
1 − k
1 + k
P
￿￿
2. Second, consider k <   k where   P = π(  k,   L) satisﬁes
  L −
1 −   k
1 +   k
  P = 0.
(Note that   k > ˆ k for   L < L, where ˆ k is deﬁned as in lemma 1.) In that
case we obviously have dP/dL = 0 since the lottery the banker faces if
k is low does not depend on L.
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Figure 1: The renegotiation game in extensive form
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Figure 2: Maximum pleadeable payments of an entrepreneur
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Figure 3: Maximum pleadeable payments of a banker
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Figure 4: Eﬀects of a collateral damage.
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